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The Next Financial Hurricane? Rethinking Municipal
Bankruptcy in Louisiana
I. INTRODUCTION: IS THERE A STORM BREWING?
A combination of the recent economic recession, the declining
housing market, and growing public pension liability concerns has
incited significant chatter about cities and towns in financial
crisis.1 Municipalities are struggling to pay their debts; at the same
time, states are severely cutting funds to local governments,
forcing them to provide essential services from their dwindling
coffers.2 The mantra “do more with less” sounds good, but the
reality is that many governments seem unable to cut spending or
raise revenues sufficiently to meet their obligations.3 Across the
nation, many cities struggling to balance their budgets are
considering bankruptcy as a solution to the problem.4 Chapter 9 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides relief to municipalities that can

Copyright 2012, by LAUREN M. WOLFE.
1. For the first time in history, Moody’s Rating Agency gave a negative
outlook for the U.S. local government sector as a whole. Omer Kimhi, Chapter
9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 351, 352 (2010).
2. For fiscal year 2010, 48 out of the 50 states “face[d] budget shortfalls,”
totaling $192 billion. Helen Avery, Judgement Day Nears for the Benighted
States, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1, 2010; see also Ameet Sachdev, Official:
Municipal Bankruptcy Fears Overblown, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 2010, at 19
(“With states also financially strapped, lifelines to cities may dwindle and
bankruptcy could become a more attractive option.”); Omer Kimhi, Reviving
Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 639
(2008).
3. Local governments rely on taxes for revenue, which are collected only
once or twice a year. In order to fund projects and provide services that tax
revenues cannot immediately fund, they issue municipal bonds. For an overview
on why municipalities default on their debt obligations, see Kimhi, supra note 2,
at 637–47.
4. Los Angeles’s former mayor suggested the city pursue bankruptcy in
light of its fiscal woes. Rick Orlov, City Budget Crisis Bankruptcy: L.A.’s Best
Option? Council: Some Advocates Say Filing Would Allow for Pension, Benefits
Reform, DAILY NEWS (Los Angeles, Cal.), Apr. 11, 2010, at A1. Some city
officials for Harrisburg, Pennsylvania have recommended the state capital file
for bankruptcy to solve its budget deficit of $164 million over the next five
years. Harrisburg in Crisis: A Burning Issue, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 2010, at 70.
Jefferson County, Alabama, encompassing the city of Birmingham, became the
largest municipality in history to file for bankruptcy after a settlement deal for
the County’s $3.14 billion debt arising from a court-ordered sewer project fell
through. Melinda Dickinson, Alabama County Files Biggest Municipal
Bankruptcy, REUTERS, Nov. 10, 2011.
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no longer meet their financial obligations.5 Although it is a
relatively rare phenomenon, several states, including Louisiana,
have witnessed their cities and towns file for bankruptcy.6
Municipal bankruptcy is a drastic measure with significant
consequences and thus should be considered only as a last resort.7
Although bankruptcy can give a municipality temporary relief
from debt, it can also result in long-term economic damage and
adversely affect its neighboring cities or even the state as a whole.8
Recognizing the gravity of these risks, the Louisiana Legislature
enacted conservative legislation that imposes state approval
requirements in addition to those set forth by federal law.9 In order
to file, the Louisiana State Bond Commission—comprised of
numerous top state officials—must first approve the petition.10
Even if bankruptcy is pursued as a last resort, these additional state

5. Only Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is available to
municipalities. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008).
6. In 1999, the Lower Cameron Parish Hospital Service District became
the first and only Louisiana municipality to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9.
The hospital’s chief executive officer stole over $400,000 in hospital funds by
fraudulently charging Medicare $1.4 million in falsified medical services. The
hospital subsequently owed Medicare $8 million for the overpayments, but only
had a liquidation value of $160,000. The hospital district emerged from
bankruptcy a year later, at which time the residents voted to lease the hospital to
a private management company. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Ex-CEO Pleads
Guilty to Medicare Fraud; La. Hospital Exec Faces Five Years in Prison for
Bilking Medicare out of $1.4 Million, MODERN HEALTHCARE June 25, 2001, at
15; Mary Chris Jaklevic, Bankrupt But Open: La. Hospital that Owes HCFA
Millions Wins Reprieve, MODERN HEALTHCARE Oct. 16, 2000, at 50.
7. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
8. The main arguments against municipal bankruptcy are summarized by
Christopher Smith, Provisions for Access to Chapter 9 Bankruptcy: Their Flaws
and the Inadequacy of Past Reforms, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 497, 521–22 (1998).
See also discussion infra Part III.B.2.
9. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4741 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
39:1410.64 (2005); see also discussion infra Part IV.C. Federal law requires the
states to enact statutes specifically granting access to Chapter 9. 11 U.S.C. §
109(c)(2) (2006); see also discussion infra Part III.A.2. Louisiana enacted its
municipal bankruptcy statute in 1935. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4741 (2006).
“Louisiana . . . ha[s] challenging approval requirements, specifically prohibiting
Chapter 9 filings unless certain conditions are met.” Daniel J. Freyberg,
Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State Authorization to be a Chapter 9
Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency—and What Will
States Do Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (1997).
10. The State Bond Commission is comprised of the State treasurer,
governor, lieutenant governor, president of the senate, speaker of the house,
secretary of state, attorney general, commissioner of administration, chairmen of
the legislative fiscal committees and two legislators. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
39:1401(A) (2005).
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approval requirements may present significant hurdles for
Louisiana municipal governments to overcome.
This Comment argues that the State Bond Commission
approval requirement is sound in theory but not in practice.
Because municipal bankruptcy has significant political
consequences, obtaining the State Bond Commission’s approval
may be virtually impossible. Moreover, there is a more qualified
person, with fewer political motivations and a more comprehensive
understanding of the municipality’s predicament who can decide
which filings to approve. The fiscal administrator—who is
appointed to manage a municipality’s financial affairs during a
fiscal crisis—is that person. This Comment posits that giving the
fiscal administrator filing approval authority will make the
management of municipal financial crises more efficient and
effective and will ensure that bankruptcy is pursued only as a last
resort.
Part II begins with a discussion of national and local trends in
municipal bankruptcy. Part III provides a general overview of
Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code with an analysis of the pros
and cons of the process. Part IV describes Louisiana’s laws on
municipal debt, fiscal administration, and bankruptcy
authorization. Part V explores the positive and negative aspects of
the current legislation. Following this analysis, Part VI
recommends amending Louisiana’s legislation to authorize the
fiscal administrator to approve a Chapter 9 filing and establishing
statutory guidelines to assist the fiscal administrator in this
decision. As a result of these modifications, this Comment
envisions a more predictable and streamlined bankruptcy process
for the municipalities of Louisiana.
II. WILL IT BE A CATEGORY I OR CATEGORY V HURRICANE?
A. An Almanac of Municipal Bankruptcy
Approximately 600 municipalities have filed for Chapter 9
bankruptcy since 1937.11 Of those cases, some of the most
publicized involved California municipalities.12 In 2009, the city of
11. Compared with the 15,000 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in 2009 alone,
municipal bankruptcies are relatively rare. Matt Miller, Taboo: Chapter 9, THE
DEAL (Mar. 19, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/2010/03/
taboo:-chapter-9/.
12. The most famous Chapter 9 proceeding involved Orange County,
California. In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). In
1994, the County made headlines after its treasurer’s high-risk investment
scheme failed due to rising interest rates. The County filed for Chapter 9 with
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Vallejo became the largest California city to file for Chapter 9 after
it failed to meet its financial obligations.13 Facing $10 million in
debt as a result of unsustainable government employee pension
agreements and a debilitated tax base due to residential
foreclosures, city officials felt bankruptcy was the only remaining
option.14 The City’s debt counselor conceded that “Vallejo’s
finances were so bad and its reserves so exhausted that city
officials ran the danger of violating the law had it not filed.”15
Unfortunately, Vallejo’s problems worsened after its discharge
from bankruptcy. Unable to rehabilitate its image or quell concerns
of future insolvency, the City suffered an exodus of businesses and
residents, which has stymied its financial recovery.16 Recognizing
the adverse consequences of municipal bankruptcy, the California
Legislature considered an amendment to restrict access to Chapter
9 bankruptcy in the 2010 regular session.17
Although large cities like Vallejo tend to garner the most media
attention, small municipalities, such as utilities and school boards,

more than $1.7 billion in debt. In 1996, the court approved the debt readjustment
plan, which called for the County to repay a more manageable, reduced portion
of its debts. After six years of litigation, the County emerged from bankruptcy
and has regained a respectable bond rating. See A Sobering Event: County’s
Bankruptcy Filing Rattles Bond Market, NATION’S CITIES WEEKLY, Dec. 12,
1994, at 1; Jennifer Grzeskowiak, Chapter 9 Bankruptcy is No Easy Option,
AMERICAN CITY & COUNTY (Apr. 21, 2010); Jay Reeves, Alabama County on
the Ropes: Biggest Municipal Bankruptcy Looms, FLINT JOURNAL, Aug. 6, 2008,
at 1; Keeok Park, To File or Not to File: The Causes of Municipal Bankruptcy in
the United States, J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT., July 1, 2004, at
228.
13. Avery, supra note 2; see also In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Vallejo has a population
of 120,000 and is located across the bay from San Francisco. Bob Adelmann,
Conjuring Magic to Cover States’ Debts Fiscal Reality Sets In: State, Unlike the
Federal Government, Cannot Print Money to Cover Their Debts, But…, NEW
AMERICAN, Aug. 30, 2010, at 10.
14. J.M. Brown & Sarah Rohrs, Bankruptcy Good for City, Some Saying:
Mortgage Crisis, Wal-Mart’s Departure Blamed for Woes that Could Leave
Many Out of Work, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), Feb. 23, 2008,
at A3.
15. Miller, supra note 11.
16. Avery, supra note 2.
17. Rich Saskal, Clock Runs Out on California Bills, BOND BUYER, Sept. 2,
2010, at 1. In 2010, California was the lowest-rated State in the union with
ratings of A- by Standard & Poor, Baa1 by Moody’s, and BBB by Fitch. Here’s
another ‘I Told ‘Ya so” for the Muni Buyers, PHIL’S STOCK WORLD (Mar. 11,
2010),
http://www.philstockworld.com/2010/03/11/hers-another-i-told-ya-sofor-the-muni-buyers/.
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actually account for the majority of Chapter 9 filings.18 For
example, Connector 2000, a South Carolina non-profit
transportation district financing the construction of a toll road, filed
for Chapter 9 in 2010 after toll revenues fell significantly short of
expectations.19 The municipality faced almost $369 million in
bond debt at the time of filing.20 Although cases involving small
municipalities like Connector 2000 are more likely to arise, they
are still considered anomalies in the bankruptcy world. Of the 1.6
million bankruptcy cases filed nationwide in the 2010 fiscal year,
only 12 were under Chapter 9.21 However, there has been an
overall increase in municipal bankruptcies, especially in the last
five years.22 In 2009, seven municipalities filed for bankruptcy, up
from four in 2008.23 Although these numbers may seem
insignificant at first glance, when one considers the impact that a
single municipal bankruptcy can have on a population, the
numbers should not be casually dismissed.24
B. The Financial Forecast
Connector 2000 and Vallejo illustrate the effects of the souring
economy that have led financial analysts and economists to
speculate that municipal bankruptcies will soon spike.25 Indeed, the
media finds the mere mention of the word “bankruptcy”
18. Most municipalities that file for Chapter 9 are relatively small. The
median population size of municipalities that filed between 1976 and January
2009 was about 1,000. Kimhi, supra note 1, at 360.
19. Michael Bathon & Dawn McCarty, Connector 2000 Association Files
Bankruptcy in South Carolina, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 25, 2010;
Patrick Temple-West, Chap. 9 Plan in S.C. Hits Pothole, BOND BUYER, Aug.
16, 2010, at 1.
20. See Temple-West, supra note 19.
21. Sachdev, supra note 2, at 18.
22. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 24 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.
23. Id.
24. Municipal bond defaults rose from $329 million in 2007 to over $7.5
billion in 2008. William M. VanDenburgh, Philip J. Harmelink & Edward M.
Werner, Reevaluating State-Specific Muni Bond Funds, CPA JOURNAL, Feb. 1,
2010, at 56; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
25. Moody’s Investors Service released a report in 2009 that called into
question the credit quality of all local governments. The rating agency predicted
increased negative ratings for municipal bonds throughout the country.
VanDenburgh, Harmelink & Werner, supra note 24; see also Peter Benvenutti,
et al., An Overview of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: Municipal Debt
Adjustments, MONDAQ BLOG (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/united
states/article.asp?articleid=108258.
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newsworthy.26 With the media speculating as to possible
bankruptcies in Los Angeles27 and Detroit,28 and in light of
Jefferson County’s recent filing,29 it is hard not to be concerned
about the possibility of widespread governmental bankruptcy.
Although analysts concede that there may not be significant
increases in Chapter 9 filings in the next few years, they argue the
perfect storm is looming just off the radar.30 This imminent
disaster is the estimated $1 trillion in unfunded public pension
liabilities that municipalities nationwide have amassed.31 Unlike
private pensions, public pensions are not federally regulated nor
are they guaranteed.32 As a result, municipalities have been “left in
a largely unregulated vacuum, free to make their own choices”
about how to fund and pay these benefits.33 There is a growing
concern that local governments will fail to pay their retired
workers the pensions they were promised and that the only way to
avoid paying them will be to declare bankruptcy.34
Despite the media attention, there are others who doubt the
possibility of widespread Chapter 9 filings.35 For example, some
municipal bond brokers and analysts have concluded that given the
stigma associated with bankruptcy, municipalities will file only as
a last resort.36 They conclude there is simply too much at risk
politically. Local government officials “are slow to solve these
26. Before a municipality even files for Chapter 9, the media is quick to
speculate that such a filing will in fact occur. See, e.g., Sharon Smith, Bankruptcy,
‘Option of Last Resort,’ Might Not Hurt Harrisburg, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg,
Pa.), Sept. 19, 2010, http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2010/09/
bankruptcy_option_of_last_reso.html; Orlov, supra note 4 at A1.
27. Orlov, supra note 4, at A1.
28. Nancy Kaffer, Chapter 9 Among Detroit's Few Options: Budget Crisis
Puts City in Danger of Bankruptcy, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., Apr. 12, 2010, at 17.
29. Dickinson, supra note 4.
30. James Chatz & Marc S. Zazlavsky, Pension Reform – The Time has
Come, The Time is Now, MONDAQ BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.mondaq.
com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=109316; Gus Lubin, And Now, Here’s the
First 11 State Pension Funds That Will Run Out of Money, BUS. INSIDER, (Oct.
18, 2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-state-pension-funds-in-the-mosttrouble-2010-10#6-louisiana-6.
31. Some estimate the deficit to be as high as $4 trillion. Benvenutti, et al.,
supra note 25.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Miller, supra note 11 (quoting James Berman, debtor counsel for
Bridgeport, Connecticut); see also Adelmann, supra note 13, at 10.
35. Luke Baker, et al., Municipal Bankruptcy: Chapter 9, WELLS FARGO
BANK (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.davieswealthms.com/new/daviesfinancial/
WF.%20Municipal%20Bankruptcy.%202-22-10.pdf?advisorid=331384.
36. Eric Young, Panel: Cities Cut More But Won’t Go Bust, S. F. BUS.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010.
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problems because that would call attention to themselves as bad
decision makers.”37 Instead of bankruptcy, analysts argue that
municipalities will continue to make drastic budget cuts and raise
taxes to meet rising debt obligations.38 But there is a point at which
the municipality cannot legally cut any more expenses or raise
taxes any higher.39
C. Bankruptcy on the Bayou? Municipal Bankruptcy Trends in
Louisiana
Unfortunately, Louisiana is not immune from the economic
threat demonstrated by national trends. Numerous Louisiana
municipalities have experienced significant financial emergencies
as a result of government mismanagement, fraud, large monetary
tort judgments, and natural disasters.40 Although only one
Louisiana municipality, a rural Cameron Parish hospital district,
has actually completed a Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding, several
other requests to file were either subsequently withdrawn or
rejected by the State.41
In 2005, Louisiana suffered “devastation unprecedented in
modern U.S. history.”42 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita collectively
37. Miller, supra note 11 (quoting Jeffrey Cohen, a Denver-based partner at
Patton Boggs LLP).
38. See Young, supra note 36.
39. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
40. St. Landry Parish faced a financial crisis after local officials failed to
make necessary but unpopular budget cuts. See Donald Yacoe, St. Landry
Parish, La., to Meet Payments on Debt, Despite Being Near Insolvency, BOND
BUYER, Feb. 19, 1992, at 2; see also discussion infra Part VI.C. The Orleans
Parish School Board faced similar fiscal woes due to a “combination of
ineptitude and theft.” Editorial, Taking Control, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Apr. 5, 2003, at 6. The Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office asked
the State to file for Chapter 9 after a $15 million judgment was cast against it.
See Allen M. Johnson, Jr., Orleans DA Seeks State OK to File for Bankruptcy,
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 6, 2009, at B2; see also discussion infra
Part VI.C. Following Hurricane Katrina, many Louisiana municipalities had
uncertain financial futures. See BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & THE PUB.
AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY IN PERSPECTIVE
1 (2006).
41. The Lower Cameron Parish Hospital Service District filed for Chapter 9
bankruptcy in 1999. See Jaklevic, supra note 6. The Orleans Parish District
Attorney’s Office requested to file after a $15 million judgment was rendered
against it; but it later withdrew its request. Jim Watts, New Orleans District
Attorney Withdraws Bankruptcy Petition, BOND BUYER, Jan. 12, 2009, at 4; see
also discussion infra Part VI.C. Tangipahoa Parish’s request to file was rejected
by the State in 1988. Yacoe, supra note 40, at 2.
42. BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & THE PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL
OF LA., supra note 40, at 1.
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damaged or destroyed over 200,000 residences, ruined over 18,000
businesses, and displaced over 422,000 citizens.43 Local
governments were forced to shoulder the enormous burden of
paying debts, providing services, and rebuilding infrastructure
despite having lost a significant portion of their tax bases.44
Extended emergency federal funding prevented numerous
municipalities teetering on the brink of bankruptcy from becoming
insolvent.45 This federal support compensated for the obliterated
tax bases and allowed Louisiana and its municipalities to survive
the disaster.46 In fact, Louisiana experienced unprecedented budget
growth as a result of recovery spending.47
Although Louisiana’s financial situation appears to have
stabilized, it is uncertain whether these recent budgetary gains can
be sustained. Indeed, the Public Affairs Research Council of
Louisiana, analyzing U.S. Census Bureau data, concluded the gains
will be short-lived.48 This means that, because the budget increases
are merely a consequence of federal relief for an unprecedented
environmental disaster, the economic future of Louisiana is not
necessarily as secure as current budgetary numbers reflect.49
Louisiana municipalities experiencing economic hardships in the
future probably will not get this kind of federal funding to avoid
insolvency.
Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that Louisiana is predicted
to exhaust its public pension fund in the next ten years.50 By 2020,
economists predict the pension bill to be $4.3 billion, or 27% of the
State revenue.51 The pension fund will be depleted unless the
government can raise enough revenue to meet the rising costs.52 As
a result, the State may no longer be able to supplement municipal
budgets or provide economic relief during crises. If they are unable
to operate without state financial assistance, bankruptcy may be an
43. Id.
44. Id. Then-governor Kathleen Blanco stated, “I don’t think that we’ve seen
a catastrophic event like this before where local governments were completely
devastated and in some cases lost their entire tax base.” Jennifer Medina &
Christine Hauser, Storm and Crisis: New Orleans; Local Governments Face
Bankruptcy, Layoffs or Both, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A17.
45. JENNIFER PIKE, PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., STATE AND
LOCAL REVENUE AND SPENDING: HOW LOUISIANA COMPARES POST-KATRINA 2
(2010).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id.
50. Lubin, supra note 30.
51. Id.; see also Avery, supra note 2.
52. Lubin, supra note 30.

2012]

COMMENT

563

option that Louisiana’s municipalities will have to consider. A
critical look at both Louisiana’s municipal bankruptcy laws and
Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is thus warranted.
III. THE FEDERAL “LEVEE”: CHAPTER 9 OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY
CODE
A. Chapter 9: An Overview
1. A Brief History
In 1934, Congress enacted Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code to give court protection for financially distressed
municipalities while allowing them to adjust their debts in a
manner which enables them to continue providing essential public
services.53 That year, municipalities throughout the nation
struggled to maintain fiscal health as a result of the Great
Depression.54 By 1936, over 2,000 municipalities had defaulted on
their obligations.55 Congress originally envisioned the legislation
as a temporary solution, but before municipalities could take
advantage of the law, the Supreme Court ruled it was
unconstitutional as a violation of state sovereignty.56 In 1937,
Congress successfully redrafted the legislation to avoid violating
the Tenth Amendment.57 However, the law remained virtually
untouched until the 1970s when the city of New York experienced
53. See Park, supra note 12; see also Melanie Cyganowski, Guest Words:
Muni World Needs to Grasp the Basics of Chapter 9, BOND BUYER, Aug. 30,
2010, at 6.
54. See Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1002.
55. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 533–
34 (1936), (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
56. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that:
If federal bankruptcy laws can be extended to [a municipality], why
not to the state? If voluntary proceedings may be permitted, so may
involuntary ones, subject, of course, to any inhibition of the Eleventh
Amendment. If the state were proceeding under a statute like the
present one, with terms broad enough to include her, apparently the
problem would not be materially different. Our special concern is
with the existence of the power claimed—not merely the immediate
outcome of what has already been attempted. And it is of the first
importance that due attention be given to the results which might be
brought about by the exercise of such a power in the future.
Id. at 530 (citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
57. U.S. v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938); see also Freyberg, supra note 9,
at 1003–4.
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an extreme financial crisis.58 To make it easier for large cities like
New York to utilize Chapter 9, Congress amended the laws to
remove the requirement that 51% of a municipality’s creditors
must agree on the debt readjustment plan.59 Despite this change
and others, very few municipalities have filed for bankruptcy to
date.60 This is due in part to the decision of most states to restrict
or forbid access to Chapter 9.61
2. Requirements for Filing
To file a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 9, a municipality
must meet five statutory requirements.62 First, the entity must
qualify as a municipality, defined in the Code as a “political
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State.”63
Second, the municipality must demonstrate its insolvency.64 The
Code describes “insolvency” as the municipality “generally not
paying its debts as they become due” or its inability “to pay its
debts as they become due.”65

58. See Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1004.
59. ROBIN JEWELER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33924, MUNICIPAL
REORGANIZATION: CHAPTER 9 OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE 3 (2007). A
large municipality like New York City generally has hundreds, if not thousands
of creditors. It could hardly be expected to successfully negotiate with a
majority of its creditors. “Thus, the primary relief generally sought by a
debtor—the breathing spell from its importuning and litigious creditors provided
by the bankruptcy automatic stay—was unavailable when needed most by the
beleaguered city.” COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011).
60. See Freyberg, supra note 9 at 1004. Only about 600 municipalities have
filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy since 1937. Miller, supra note 11.
61. See Smith, supra note 8, at 499.
62. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2006). Because the Code does not further define
what entities are included within these terms, the courts have concluded that an
entity is a “municipality” if it is subject to the control of state or municipal
public authority. See, e.g., In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 317, 323 n.1
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (rejecting a claim by the bond insurer that the company
was a municipality and therefore not entitled to Chapter 11 proceedings). States
have likewise crafted their own statutory definitions in accordance with the
jurisprudential guidance. See Park, supra note 12; Smith, supra note 8, at 516.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2006).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2006). This imprecise language requires courts
to make tough decisions as to whether the municipality filing under Chapter 9 is
truly insolvent. For example, during initial bankruptcy proceedings for the city
of Bridgeport, Connecticut, the court found the City was not insolvent because it
had not exhausted its assets and was simply speculating as to its insolvency. In
re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 338 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
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Third, in order to avoid a violation of state sovereignty, each
state must statutorily authorize its municipalities to file for Chapter
9.66 Today, over half of the states do not have statutes granting
their municipalities access to federal bankruptcy court.67 Only one
state, Georgia, explicitly forbids its municipalities from filing for
bankruptcy.68 The remaining states have statutes that range widely
in permissiveness. Some allow their municipalities free access to
the courts, while others require the approval of various state
officials before filing.69 Louisiana falls on the restrictive end of the
spectrum, requiring approval from the State Bond Commission
before a municipality can file a petition in bankruptcy court.70
The fourth and fifth requirements are designed to promote
good faith on the part of the municipality.71 The fourth requirement
is that the municipality must “desire[] to effect a plan to adjust [its]
debts.”72 Basically, this condition ensures the municipality is not
simply evading its creditors or buying time to repay its debts.73 The
fifth requirement imposes an obligation on the municipality to
attempt to negotiate a debt readjustment plan with its creditors.74
If the municipality meets these requirements, it can file a
petition, accompanied by a list of its creditors and a proposed debt
reorganization plan.75 If the court accepts the petition, an automatic
stay becomes effective, which prevents the collection of any of the
66. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2006). The legislation was amended in 1994 to
address the disagreement as to whether a municipality required express
permission to file or if simply not being prohibited from doing so was sufficient.
Congress ended the debate by requiring specific authorization by states. See
Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1006–09.
67. See Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1008–9, nn. 66–70.
68. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (Westlaw 2011).
69. See Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1008–16.
70. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4741 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
39:1410.64 (2005).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (2006); 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5) (2006).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (2006).
73. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.02(2)(d) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5) (2006). There are four possible negotiation
scenarios contemplated by the legislation. First, and most ideally, the
municipality will successfully negotiate a debt plan with its creditors. Second, in
the event that the municipality does not obtain the consent of its creditors, as
long as it has negotiated in good faith, the municipality will be able to submit its
plan. Third, if the court deems negotiations to be impracticable, then the
municipality does not have to obtain creditor consent. Finally, if the
municipality reasonably believes it will reach an agreement with its creditors
during the bankruptcy proceeding, the court will accept the municipality’s
petition. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.02(2)(e) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2006).
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municipality’s debt obligations during the court proceedings.76
Once the court confirms the final debt readjustment plan, the
municipality is discharged from bankruptcy.77
B. Pros and Cons of Chapter 9
Although Chapter 9 can provide hope to a municipality that
cannot meet its debt obligations using conventional methods, it
also brings a host of potential adverse consequences that can affect
not only the municipality, but also its neighboring cities and the
state. For this reason, a municipality should carefully weigh all of
its options before choosing bankruptcy.
1. Benefits of Chapter 9
The automatic stay of Chapter 9 is perhaps its greatest
benefit.78 All collection actions, including those by the
municipality’s own officials and residents, are suspended once the
court accepts its petition.79 This affords some breathing room
within which municipal officials can effectively reorganize the
debt.80 Another benefit of Chapter 9 is that only one class of
creditors needs to approve the proposed debt readjustment plan for
the court to confirm it.81 As long as the plan is “fair and equitable”
and one class of creditors accepts it, the judge can “cram down”
the plan onto all other creditors.82 Thus the tables are turned on the
creditors who are now in a relatively weaker bargaining position
than the municipality.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 945 (2006).
78. Although the automatic stay is an established element of Chapter 9, one
of Vallejo’s creditors filed a motion in 2010 to counter the automatic stay. The
creditor argued that revenue from the city’s credit enhancement program (motor
vehicle fees) should go to the bondholders, not the municipality. Maureen Nevin
Duffy, One Towns [sic] Bankruptcy Could Spread to Bond Market,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1, 2010.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).
80. See JEWELER, supra note 59, at 6.
81. Id. at 9. A “class of creditors” is a group of creditors entitled to similar
treatment in a bankruptcy case.
82. The statute provides that:
[I]f all of the applicable requirements . . . are met with respect to a plan,
the court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan
. . . if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable,
with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under,
and has not accepted, the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006). Chapter 9 incorporates the “cram down”
provision of Chapter 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2006).
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As a result of Tenth Amendment considerations, the
municipality also retains significant governing powers for the
duration of a Chapter 9 proceeding.83 Most significantly, there is
no provision for a liquidation of its assets.84 As a result, the court
cannot force a municipality to sell its police car or fire truck
inventory in order to pay its debts.85 Because a municipality must
provide basic safety and health services both during and after the
bankruptcy proceeding, it would be nonsensical to liquidate the
very assets needed to provide such services. Furthermore, the
municipality can raise taxes and take on additional loans as
administrative expenses, which is particularly useful if it has no
remaining assets.86 Finally, as opposed to a Chapter 11 proceeding
where the judge controls most aspects of a business’s affairs, the
court has a relatively hands-off role in a Chapter 9 proceeding.87
The presiding judge’s duties consist of approving the initial
petition, confirming the proposed debt readjustment plan, and
overseeing the implementation of the approved plan.88 If the new
debt plan cannot be implemented or confirmed, the court does not
have any power to force it upon the municipality.89
2. Possible Adverse Effects of a Chapter 9 Proceeding
Although Chapter 9 provides significant benefits to a
struggling municipality, there are counterbalancing effects it
should consider. First, bankruptcy can be the worst neighborhood
eyesore imaginable.90 Given the choice, most people would not
choose to live in a failing city.91 For example, many of the citizens
and businesses of Vallejo, California left town as a result of the
City’s bankruptcy.92 The City is now offering guided bus tours of
foreclosed homes to anyone with a loan pre-qualification letter and
83. See Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1001; see also JEWELER, supra note 59, at
2–3, 7.
84. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01(1) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011).
85. Id.
86. Id. at ¶ 900.01(2); see also Grzeskowiak, supra note 12 (quoting Dan
Miller, City Controller of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, who opined that bankruptcy
is a better option in the long-term because the city can retain revenue-producing
assets).
87. Id. at ¶ 900.01(2)(c).
88. Id. at ¶ 900.01(1); Kimhi, supra note 1, at 375.
89. Id. at ¶ 900.01(1).
90. Kimhi, supra note 1, at 382.
91. Id. at 352; Lyndee Kemmet, Detroit Should Avoid Bankruptcy, DETROIT
NEWS, Sept. 9, 2009, at A15.
92. See Avery, supra note 2.
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a driver’s license.93 This is a terrible scenario for Vallejo; however,
the alternative option may not have yielded much better results.
Municipal governments can raise taxes and cut services, but there
is a point at which this course of action becomes
counterproductive. Residents and businesses may choose to
relocate to more affordable areas, which will then decrease the
municipality’s tax base.94
Many analysts also argue that bankruptcy will cause
irreversible damage to a municipality’s bond rating and ability to
obtain future credit.95 In 2010, Fitch Ratings threatened to
downgrade the credit rating of municipalities that even discussed a
Chapter 9 option.96 Furthermore, a Chapter 9 filing may also
adversely affect neighboring cities and the state as a whole.97
Because a state is strongly tied to its municipalities’ financial
management, the failure of one city could make the entire state
look fiscally incompetent.98 Indeed, the bond rating agencies also
threatened to downgrade the state’s credit rating if any of its
municipalities file for Chapter 9.99 This contagion effect is a
significant concern of state officials nationwide.100
Although a bankruptcy proceeding will probably degrade a
municipality’s bond rating in the short term,101 there is no proof it
will significantly affect a municipality’s ability to obtain loans in
the future.102 In fact, there are examples that indicate the opposite

93. Id.
94. Kimhi, supra note 2, at 658. The municipality’s tax base is its primary
source of revenue. See supra note 3.
95. See Kimhi, supra note 1, at 383–4.
96. See Benvenutti, et al., supra note 25, at 1. A downgraded credit rating
may prevent the municipality from obtaining future loans, bond insurance, and
reasonable interest rates. Miller, supra note 11.
97. See Kimhi, supra note 1, at 382–3; Smith, supra note 8, at 521.
98. Interview with John Kennedy, Louisiana State Treasurer, in Baton
Rouge, La. (Sept. 10, 2010).
99. See Kimhi, supra note 1, at 383.
100. The chief economist for the Los Angeles County Economic
Development Corporation stated that “[d]eclaring bankruptcy would be horrible
for the city, horrible for L.A. County and horrible for all of Southern
California.” Orlov, supra note 4, at A1. A senior research analyst at the
Michigan Citizens Research Council opined that a Chapter 9 proceeding would
have a domino effect on all local governments, causing them to have more
difficulty selling bonds and accessing the credit markets. Kaffer, supra note 28,
at 17.
101. Grzeskowiak, supra note 12; Carolyn Okomo, Teaching Detroit
Educators a Fiscal Lesson, DAILY DEAL, Aug. 5, 2009 (arguing that filing for
Chapter 9 would cause short term damage to the city’s bond rating).
102. See Benvenutti, et al., supra note 25, at 9.
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result.103 For instance, Orange County, California obtained a
respectable AA rating within months of its bankruptcy.104 Such
cases suggest the credit markets are receptive to municipalities that
have successfully rehabilitated themselves following a Chapter 9
proceeding.105
Inarguably, a Chapter 9 proceeding itself is very expensive and
can drain precious remaining municipal assets.106 The debtor
counsel for the small town of Westfall, Pennsylvania opined that
despite being a debtor in perhaps the most straightforward Chapter
9 case imaginable (there was only one creditor and no subsequent
appeal) the town was charged over $600,000 in attorney and
accountant fees.107 Bankruptcy proceedings involving large
municipalities with multiple creditors and subsequent appeals
would surely dwarf that sum.108
There are good reasons why most economists and scholars say
bankruptcy should be an option of last resort.109 It is very
expensive and can cause short-term damage to the economic
reputation of the municipality, as well as the state as a whole.110
However, despite these drawbacks, Chapter 9 has numerous
benefits and can be the saving grace for a municipality in distress.
If denied the opportunity to file for bankruptcy, the municipality’s
problems will not go away on their own. The local government
will be forced to raise taxes and cut services excessively, which
103. Orange County obtained a high bond rating shortly after being
discharged from bankruptcy. See Benvenutti, et al., supra note 25, at 9. In
Louisiana, the sole municipality to go bankrupt under Chapter 9 received
approval from the State for loans within a few years after its proceeding. Press
Release, La. Dep’t of the Treasury, State Treasurer John Kennedy Announces
Statewide Bond Commission Approvals (Oct. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.treasury.state.la.us/ (select “News Room,” then select “Press
Releases”).
104. See Miller, supra note 11. Orange County’s bond rating continued to
improve to Aaa, the highest rating given by Moody’s Investor Services.
Benvenutti, et al., supra note 25, at 9.
105. Id. at 10.
106. See J. Gregg Miller, Pros and Cons of Chapter 9 Bankruptcy,
PENNLIVE.COM (May 16, 2010), http://www.pennlive.com/editorials/index.ssf/
2010/05/pros_and_cons_of_chapter_9_ban.html.
107. Id.
108. The City of Vallejo had over $7 million in fees following its Chapter 9
proceeding. Avery, supra note 2.
109. See, e.g., Benvenutti, et al., supra note 25, at 1; ERIC MONTARTI,
ALLEGHENY INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY: WHAT IT
MEANS FOR PENNSYLVANIA’S MUNICIPALITIES 2, 4 (2009); Ryan Preston Dahl,
Collective Bargaining Agreements and Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR.
L. J. 295, 322, 336 (2007).
110. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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can have a deleterious effect on its neighboring cities and the
state.111 Therefore, it is prudent to make municipal bankruptcy a
viable option for municipalities that have no other feasible course
of action left.
IV. THE STATE “LEVEE”: LOUISIANA’S LAWS ON DEBT AND
BANKRUPTCY
Louisiana enacted a series of laws designed to prevent local
government fiscal crises from arising and to help manage such
emergencies when they do occur. The State is involved in every
step of the municipal financial management process—from
creating a budget to filing for bankruptcy. The current legislation
has been relatively effective as demonstrated by respectable bond
ratings and a dearth of municipal bankruptcies.112
A. Budget and Debt Requirements
Louisiana municipalities have a statutory obligation to
maintain a balanced budget.113 The State considers fiscal
responsibility so important that it has imposed criminal penalties
on local government officials that knowingly or intentionally
violate the balanced budget requirement.114 Thus from the outset,
111. See discussion infra Part V.C.4.
112. See BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & THE PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF LA.,, supra note 40, at 4; see also Credit Ratings of the State of
Louisiana, MOODY’S, http://www.moodys.com/credit-ratings/Louisiana-Stateof-credit-rating-600024555 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (Louisiana had a credit
rating of Aa1 and a “stable” outlook).
113. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:746 (2005) (“The amount so borrowed by
any parish or municipality shall in no case exceed the estimated income of the
parish or municipality as shown by the budget adopted prior to such time, and
the tax income collected as shown by the budget shall be dedicated and set aside
to the payment of the certificates of indebtedness as they mature.”); see also LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1305(E) (2005 & Supp. 2011) (“The total of proposed
expenditures shall not exceed the total of estimated funds available for the
ensuing fiscal year.”).
114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1315 (2005) (“[A]ny public official or officer
that violates, either knowingly or intentionally, the provisions of R.S.
39:1305(E), either through the adoption of an original budget or through
amendment to a legally adopted budget, shall be a violation of R.S. 14:134 and
shall be subject to the penalties contained therein.”); see also Grant v. Grace,
858 So. 2d 542, 544–5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 870 So.
2d 1011 (La. 2004) (“A recommendation by the chief of police to create new
peace officer positions without adequate funding in the budget would contravene
and impinge on the public duty and fiscal responsibility of the council to
legislate a sound budget.”).
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municipalities are responsible for forecasting estimated revenues
and expenditures to ensure that the numbers balance.
To further ensure that municipalities maintain balanced
budgets, the State Bond Commission must approve all municipal
debt before it is incurred.115 If approved, the State Bond
Commission continually monitors the debt to ensure it is timely
repaid.116 Thus the State carefully scrutinizes and monitors all
voluntarily incurred municipal debt. Municipalities, however, often
incur involuntary debt as a result of natural disaster damage, court
judgments, and fiscal mismanagement.117 This kind of debt is
usually unforeseeable and thus cannot be effectively predicted or
prevented by the municipality.
B. Fiscal Crisis—Appointment of the Fiscal Administrator
The Louisiana Legislature enacted several laws in 1990 that
enable state intervention if a municipality’s fiscal stability is in
jeopardy.118 Upon a showing that a local government cannot pay
its debts, the state legislative auditor, attorney general, and
treasurer will publicly convene to review the struggling
municipality’s financial situation.119 If the three decide that
revenues are insufficient to meet outstanding debts, the attorney
general will file a rule to appoint a fiscal administrator to take over
the local government’s finances.120 If the court finds that the local
government is “reasonably certain to fail to make a debt service
payment or reasonably certain to not have sufficient revenue to pay
current expenditures,” it will appoint a fiscal administrator.121
The newly appointed fiscal administrator investigates the
financial situation of the municipality and reports his findings to
the state treasurer, attorney general, and legislative auditor.122 This
written report contains the expected revenue and obligations for
the remainder of the fiscal year, recommended amendments to the
budget to ensure payment of the debt, the estimated deficit in the
budget, and a recommendation of whether the local government
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1410.60 (2005 & Supp. 2011).
116. State Bond Commission, LA. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://
www.treasury.state.la.us/Home%20Pages/BondCommission.aspx?@Filter=BC20
10 (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
117. See discussion infra Part VI.B.2.
118. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1351–4 (2005 & Supp. 2011).
119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1351 (2005 & Supp. 2011).
120. The local government then has between 10 and 20 days to show cause
why a fiscal administrator should not be appointed. Id.
121. Id.
122. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1352 (2005 & Supp. 2011).
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should be allowed to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.123 A week after
the local government receives the report, it must vote on the fiscal
administrator’s recommended budget changes.124 If it fails to adopt
the recommended changes, the attorney general must ask the court
to compel the local government to accept them.125 Once the new
budget is enacted, the fiscal administrator monitors the
municipality until he determines that it is fiscally healthy enough
to meet its obligations for the current and upcoming years.126 At
that point, the attorney general, local government officials, or the
fiscal administrator himself can move to terminate his
appointment.127
C. Fiscal Emergency—Access to Chapter 9 Bankruptcy
Although the local government may agree with the fiscal
administrator’s recommendation to pursue Chapter 9 bankruptcy, it
does not have the power to file on its own volition.128 The
legislature enacted two statutes addressing bankruptcy filings to
ensure that the petition is neither filed by the municipality nor
accepted by the court without State approval.129 The original
statute enacted in 1937 concerns judicial procedure.130 Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 13:4741 forbids Louisiana bankruptcy
courts from receiving a Chapter 9 petition from any “parish,
municipality, political subdivision, public board or public
corporation, taxing district, or other agency of the state” without
written approval from the State Bond Commission.131 In 1990, the
123. Id.
124. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1353 (2005 & Supp. 2011).
125. Id.
126. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1354 (2005 & Supp. 2011).
127. Id.
128. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1410.64 (2005).
129. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4741 (2006 & Supp. 2011); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39:1410.64 (2005).
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4741 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
131. Id. Although Title 13 does not provide definitions for the included
terms, the Louisiana Constitution clarifies the scope somewhat, as it defines
“political subdivision” as “a parish, municipality, and any other unit of local
government, including a school board and a special district, authorized by law to
perform governmental functions.” LA. CONST. art. VI, § 44(2). “Municipality”
refers to “an incorporated city, town, or village.” LA. CONST. art. VI, § 44(3). As
indicated supra in Part III.A.2, specificity as to what municipalities are included
in the law is critical to avoiding questions of whether a particular entity qualifies
as a municipality under Chapter 9. There has not yet been a controversy over the
status of a Louisiana entity, but, if one arises, section 13:4741’s sister statute
should clarify the issue. See infra note 133 (citing Louisiana Revised Statutes
sections 39:1410.64 and 39:1410.60).
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legislature enacted a somewhat duplicative statute, which
specifically applies to municipalities.132 Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 39:1410.64 prohibits municipalities from filing without
written approval from the State Bond Commission.133 At first
glance, these approval requirements may seem insignificant, but
the State Bond Commission is actually an extremely powerful state
body.
Created in 1968, the State Bond Commission manages the debt
of the State and its municipalities.134 The Commission is
comprised of the governor, lieutenant governor, president of the
senate, speaker of the house, treasurer, secretary of state, attorney
general, and chairmen of several senate and house committees.135
After reviewing the municipality’s petition, the State Bond
Commission members (or their designated representatives) vote to
authorize the Chapter 9 filing.136 Their decision is final and there is
no appeals process if the filing is denied.137
If a municipality succeeds in obtaining the State Bond
Commission’s approval to file, it faces an additional hurdle before
it can submit its debt readjustment plan to the court. Louisiana
Revised Statutes sections 39:1410.64 and 39:619 require the
written approval from the State Bond Commission, governor, and
attorney general before the court can accept the proposed plan.138
132. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1410.64 (2005).
133. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1410.64 (2005). Affected entities include
political subdivisions, parishes, municipalities, school districts, public boards,
subdivisions, taxing districts, road and subroad districts, sewerage districts,
drainage and subdrainage districts, levee districts, waterworks and
subwaterwork districts, irrigation districts, road lighting districts, harbor and
terminal districts, taxing districts, and public or political corporations. The scope
of this statute is probably broad enough to include any entity that may have been
legislatively overlooked in section 13:4741. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1410.60
(2005 & Supp. 2011).
134. In 1972, the powers, functions, and duties of the State Bond and Tax
Board were transferred to the State Bond Commission. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:1408 (2005); see also LA. CONST. art. VII, § 8(B) (“No bonds or other
obligations shall be issued or sold by the state directly or through any state
board, agency or commission, or by any political subdivision of the state, unless
prior written approval of the bond commission is obtained.”).
135. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1401 (2005 & Supp. 2011).
136. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 71, pt. 3, §103(R) (1975) (“Meetings of the
commission shall be conducted in accordance with Robert’s Rules of Order.”).
137. Id.
138. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 39:1410.64 requires State Bond
Commission approval prior to a municipality putting a debt readjustment plan
into effect or seeking its final confirmation. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1410.64
(2005). Likewise, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 39:619 prevents a
municipality from “tak[ing] any action to carry out any plan of readjustment of
its debts” or petitioning for a confirmation of the plan without written approval
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By enacting these duplicative and exacting laws, the Louisiana
Legislature severely limited a municipality’s ability to file for
bankruptcy.
V. A LEAK IN THE STATE “LEVEE”: PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT
LAW
The problem with the current law is that in trying to be
prudent, the Louisiana Legislature made municipal bankruptcy a
virtual impossibility instead of an option of last resort.139 It appears
the Legislature wanted municipalities to pursue Chapter 9 only
after careful consideration and a thorough analysis of all potential
options.140 But a closer look at the effects of the legislation reveals
that the State Bond Commission approval requirement is “a
significant hurdle for any local governmental entity contemplating
bankruptcy.”141 For a municipality saddled with crippling debt, this
hurdle appears insurmountable.
A. A Virtual Non-Option
The State’s stance on municipal bankruptcy has consistently
been that its disadvantages outweigh any advantages it might have
for a local government in financial crisis.142 Even during the
widespread financial emergency caused by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, the State was adamant in its assertion that it would not
consider allowing its political subdivisions to file for
bankruptcy.143 Given the lack of other viable options, the Public
Affairs Research Council of Louisiana implored the State to either
accept additional federal funding or open up its own coffers to
assist the struggling municipalities.144 The State eventually

from the State governor and attorney general. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:619
(2005 & Supp. 2011).
139. It is unknown why the State Bond Commission permitted Lower
Cameron Parish Hospital Services District to file for Chapter 9 in 1999. The
State Bond Commission’s records date back to 2000 and the current Director
was unaware of the particularities of the situation. Interview with Lela Folse,
acting Director of the State Bond Commission, in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 22,
2010).
140. See discussion supra Part IV.
141. See BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & THE PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF LA., supra note 40, at 8.
142. Id. at 6.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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accepted federal assistance, but it has remained adamant that it will
not entertain municipal bankruptcy petitions.145
The Chairman of the State Bond Commission put another nail
in the coffin of municipal bankruptcy when he made a
“commitment to the rating agencies and bond insurers that he will
not vote to allow any municipality in the state to enter into
bankruptcy.”146 The Chairman surely intended to benefit the State
with such promises.147 In light of the rating agencies’ tendency to
downgrade municipal bond ratings at the mere mention of the word
“bankruptcy,” it is understandable for the State to display open
hostility toward Chapter 9. However, these words also have the
effect of virtually eliminating the option for municipalities in
financial crisis.148
B. Political Nature of the State Bond Commission
The main problem with the approval requirement lies in the
controversy over municipal bankruptcy and the political nature of
the State Bond Commission. Most politicians revile Chapter 9 due
to its stigma and potential to ruin political careers.149 Not many
politicians would openly advocate bankruptcy for fear of backlash
at the polls. Although there are no proven long-term effects of
municipal bankruptcy, politicians will inevitably take the blame for
the short-term effects on the municipality’s neighbors and the
State.150 As a result, state politicians focused on the next election
might overlook the fact that bankruptcy could benefit the
municipality and the State in the long run.151 By leaving the
decision to approve a bankruptcy filing in the hands of a powerful
group of politicians, politics, rather than prudent policy, is likely to
be the primary influence.

145. See PIKE, supra note 45, at 2.
146. See BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & THE PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF LA., supra note 40, at 8.
147. Id. The state treasurer is the Chairman of the State Bond Commission.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1401(C) (2005).
148. “[T]he bankruptcy option has been removed from the table for local
governments by state officials concerned about the stigma of bankruptcy and its
potential impact on other governmental entities in the state.” BUREAU OF GOV’T
RESEARCH & THE PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., supra note 40, at 1.
149. Municipal bankruptcy is “political suicide.” Los Angeles County
supervisor Zev Yaroslavsky opined that “[a]fter Orange County declared
bankruptcy, not one of their board members ever won election again.” Orlov,
supra note 4, at A1.
150. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
151. See discussion infra Part VI.C.4.
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Interest groups also play a significant role in a politician’s
decision-making process.152 At the state level, interest groups may
represent creditors and other groups opposed to a municipal
bankruptcy proceeding.153 Because Chapter 9 puts municipal
creditors in a position of relative weakness as compared to the
local government, these interest groups would certainly lobby state
officials on the State Bond Commission to reject any bankruptcy
petition. The problem is that these groups generally promote their
own interests without considering the effects their requests will
have on the municipality or the State as a whole.154
The members of the State Bond Commission are also
motivated by different issues that can prevent them from making
decisions that are in the best interest of a municipality in crisis.
The legislative branch members have their particular constituents
in mind while the executive branch members are concerned with
the State as a whole. These diverging interests actually have the
same effect on the members’ decision-making process. The
legislative members are not likely to vote for a bankruptcy
proceeding in another voting district that may adversely affect their
constituents. Similarly, the executive members would be reluctant
to relieve one municipality’s suffering at the expense of the State.
In both instances, allowing the municipality to file for Chapter 9
could hurt the politicians at the polls.155 State politicians rarely
receive political benefits (votes and campaign support) for helping
one particular town or parish in trouble.156 In fact, there can be
considerable backlash for supporting a municipal bankruptcy.157
This is not the kind of publicity the members of the State Bond
Commission are looking for and it is bound to weigh on their
minds when it comes time to vote.

152. Kimhi, supra note 1, at 379.
153. In most states, labor unions exert considerable influence on state
officials. Because labor contracts can be voided under a Chapter 9 proceeding,
the unions have been particularly vocal in their admonishment of Chapter 9. See
Duffy, supra note 78. Although Louisiana is a “Right to Work” state, public
employee groups or creditors representing certain industries could conceivably
lobby against a municipal bankruptcy proceeding if it would adversely affect
their interests. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:981–87 (2010).
154. Kimhi, supra note 1, at 379.
155. Miller, supra note 11.
156. Kimhi, supra note 1, at 391.
157. Miller, supra note 11.
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C. Inherent Problems in the Political Process
There is also inherent delay and conflict in the political process
that can make municipal bankruptcy unavailable when it is needed
most.158 Because it is a last resort option, the residents of a
municipality in crisis can suffer from a lack of services and
exorbitant taxes for a considerable amount of time before the local
government pursues Chapter 9. Instead of gaining access to the
benefits of Chapter 9 that would immediately relieve some of their
burden, the people will continue to suffer while the State
deliberates the municipality’s petition. And because it appears that
the State Bond Commission is unlikely to authorize a filing, the
municipality’s problems may continue for the foreseeable future.
Some might argue that the people should bear the risk of
municipal insolvency because they are in a position to prevent it by
virtue of their vote.159 This argument overlooks the fact that
despite the political process, the municipality’s citizens cannot
control the government’s financial situation.160 Once their ballots
have been cast, citizens are limited in their ability to affect political
decisions. Furthermore, the people are completely powerless to
prevent financial crises arising from involuntary debt as a result of
natural disaster damage, court judgments, and the like. To demand
that the people bear the burden indefinitely because they were
supposedly in a position to prevent the crisis runs contrary to the
reality of the situation.161 Because the people were not at fault,
they should not be forced to suffer the consequences alone.
D. Lack of Ex Ante Features
The lack of statutory guidance for its decision-making process
exacerbates the effects of the political nature and inherent bias of
the State Bond Commission.162 The Legislature did not establish
any list of factors or other criteria for the State Bond Commission
to consider in determining whether the municipality should be
permitted to file.163 The decision is entirely at the whim of the
State Bond Commission. Furthermore, there is no requirement for
a written justification of its decision nor is there a process for
appealing a rejection.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Freyberg, supra note 9, at 1021.
Kimhi, supra note 2, at 656–60.
Id. at 657.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1410.64 (2005).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4741 (Supp. 2011).
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The Civil law system of Louisiana generally embraces the ex
ante statutory structure.164 Such laws seek to provide general
guidance and solutions before considering the facts of a given
situation. Many Louisiana statutes are consistent with ex ante
drafting and include criteria and factors for the courts to consider
in deciding cases.165 The result of this guidance is greater
predictability in the outcome of a legal decision and stability in the
jurisprudence over the course of time. Under the current law, a
municipality will have no guess as to how the State Bond
Commission will decide—aside from some members declaring
they will never approve a filing.166
VI. BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW “LEVEE”: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE LAW
In order to revitalize the municipal bankruptcy option, the
decision to file should be placed in the hands of a politically
disinterested yet intimately involved and knowledgeable person.
Using legislative guidelines, this person would draw from his indepth analysis of the municipality and his financial expertise to
determine whether bankruptcy is the best solution. This ideal
person is the fiscal administrator.
Because the current law does not tie the fiscal administrator to
the municipal bankruptcy process other than requiring him to
recommend whether the municipality should be permitted to file
for Chapter 9, some legislative changes are necessary. First,
Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 13:4741 and 39:1410.64
should be amended to require review and approval from a stateappointed fiscal administrator as a prerequisite for filing. The state
government will retain the power of appointment, but the decision
to file will be passed from the State Bond Commission to the fiscal
administrator.167 Second, the Legislature should enact guidelines to
assist the fiscal administrator in his decision to authorize a filing
and to ensure he considers the interests of the State.168
164. See A.J.G.M. Sanders, The Characteristic Features of the Civil Law,
INST. OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW (1981); Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The
Future of the Civil Law, 37 LA. L. REV. 645 (1977).
165. See Cueto-Rua, supra note 164.
166. See BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & THE PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF LA., supra note 40, at 8.
167. The attorney general, treasurer, and legislative auditor nominate an
individual to be fiscal administrator. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1351 (2005).
168. Currently, the fiscal administrator can recommend only a Chapter 9
filing and there are no guidelines to assist him in doing so. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:1351 (2005).
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A. Fiscal Administrator’s Power to Authorize a Chapter 9 Filing
The Fiscal Administrator is the proper person to authorize a
municipal bankruptcy proceeding. First, the Fiscal Administrator is
not a politician, so the political ramifications of a Chapter 9
proceeding will not influence his decision to file. Second, the
Fiscal Administrator is the most knowledgeable person to make the
decision given the fact that he has immersed himself in the
municipality’s financial situation. Third, unlike state politicians
who must split their efforts and time among all areas of the State,
the Fiscal Administrator is focused solely on the municipality in
crisis. Lastly, the Fiscal Administrator is accountable to the State
and the municipality for his decisions, which ensures a proper
degree of governmental oversight.
1. Non-Political Figure
Unlike the members of the State Bond Commission who are
elected officials, the fiscal administrator is not concerned with the
political implications of a bankruptcy filing. As explained above,
state politicians are not likely to make decisions that would
jeopardize their chances for reelection.169 Although cognizant of
the near-term effects of a municipal bankruptcy filing, the fiscal
administrator is more focused on taking actions that will benefit
the municipality and the State in the long run.170 Because he does
not have a constituency or a political reputation to protect, the
fiscal administrator can make politically unpopular decisions that
will benefit the municipality and the State past the next election.
Moreover, the fiscal administrator is not influenced by
creditors and interest groups in his decision-making process.
Because he has no incentive to make decisions in line with their
agenda, he is free from the pressures normally exerted on state
officials.171 For example, if inconsequential government jobs
should be cut, the fiscal administrator will not be swayed by
169. See discussion supra Part V.B.
170. The fiscal administrator’s sole duties involve analyzing and fixing the
municipality’s budget. The appointment can last many months, and sometimes
even years. See Parish to Have Money Manager, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans, La.), Jan. 1, 1992, at B5; Auditor: Cotton Valley Must Cut $25K, THE
TIMES (Shreveport, La.), Sept. 23, 2009, at 1. See also discussion supra Part
IV.B.
171. A state receiver took over the finances of the city of Chelsea,
Massachusetts in 1990. Unlike the City’s officials, the receiver was able to
“break free” from the “paralyzing grip” of labor unions that had been a major
cause of the City’s financial problems. Kimhi, supra note 2, at 671–2.
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protests or other organized efforts that might be effective against
politicians. Thus, the fiscal administrator can focus on determining
the best solutions for the municipality without being subjected to
external political pressures.172
Permitting the fiscal administrator to authorize a municipal
bankruptcy filing would not amount to a radical change in the law.
The State has already made the policy decision to intervene in
municipal affairs during financial crises. The current law grants the
fiscal administrator significant power to make budgetary decisions
on behalf of the local government. The State then enforces the
fiscal administrator’s recommendations through the court if the
municipality does not voluntarily adopt them.173 The justification
for this intervention is that the municipality is deemed incapable of
solving its problems on its own and thus requires state assistance.
The State vested significant powers in the fiscal administrator with
the intent that he will cure the municipality’s insolvency; therefore,
the authority to permit a Chapter 9 filing—also intended to remedy
insolvency—is a logical extension of the fiscal administrator’s
power under the current law.
2. Most Knowledgeable of the Municipality’s Situation
The fiscal administrator is arguably the most knowledgeable
person regarding the municipality’s financial situation. As a result
of his statutory responsibilities, the fiscal administrator will
become intimately acquainted with the municipality’s finances.174
His principal duty is to conduct a comprehensive investigation of
the municipality’s financial affairs.175 He has unfettered access to
municipal documents and records and can interrogate municipal
officials as he deems necessary.176 Once he has fully analyzed the
municipality’s situation and determined how it arrived at its
current predicament, he then decides what steps must be taken in
order to get the municipality back to fiscal health. The municipal
172. Id.
173. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1353 (Supp. 2011); see also discussion supra
Part IV.B.
174. The fiscal administrator must investigate three aspects of the
municipality’s finances. He must first estimate the revenue and expenditures for
both the remainder of the current fiscal year and the following year. He must
then recommend budget amendments that will ensure the municipality’s ability
to pay its debts for the next fiscal year. Finally, he must calculate how much
additional revenue is required if the proposed budgetary changes will not enable
the municipality to meets its financial obligations. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
39:1351 (2007).
175. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1352 (2005).
176. Id.

2012]

COMMENT

581

officials technically have the option to reject the fiscal
administrator’s proposals; however, the statute dictates that the
attorney general must ask the court to order the implementation if
the proposals are rejected.177 After the new budget is in place, the
fiscal administrator continues to monitor the municipality’s
progress.178 In sum, the fiscal administrator analyzes the situation
in depth, pinpoints the budgetary problems, corrects them, and
observes the new procedures in action. Thus, he is now in the best
position to forecast the economic future of the municipality to
determine if filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 is necessary.
4. Total Focus on the Municipality’s Situation
The fiscal administrator is also in the best position to make the
decision because he is completely devoted to analyzing the
problem and devising a solution. Unlike the members of the State
Bond Commission who have numerous other duties to perform, the
fiscal administrator is consumed with solving the municipality’s
problems. An appointment can last anywhere from six months to
several years.179 Certainly none of the State Bond Commission
members could afford to spend a few weeks, much less several
months, in the affected city. With this immersion comes a true
appreciation for the situation and the people affected by the crisis.
The fiscal administrator is the best person to authorize the filing
because he in essence has become part of the municipality.
5. Accountability
Some may question the power of a fiscal administrator because
he is not an elected official. Indeed, concerns have been raised
about the appointment of a fiscal administrator to a home rule
entity without its consent.180 These fears should be allayed by the
177. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1353 (Supp. 2011) (“If the governing
authority of the political subdivision fails to adopt such budget or budget
amendments, or if the revisions made by the governing authority of the political
subdivision do not meet the approval of the fiscal administrator, the attorney
general shall take a rule against the political subdivision . . . to show cause why
the court should not order the adoption and the implementation of the budget
without the revisions disapproved by the fiscal administrator.”) (emphasis
added).
178. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1354 (Supp. 2011).
179. See Parish to Have Money Manager, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans,
La.), Jan. 1, 1992, at B5; Auditor: Cotton Valley Must Cut $25K, THE TIMES
(Shreveport, La.), Sept. 23, 2009, at 1.
180. BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & THE PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL
OF LA., supra note 40 at 15. “Local governmental autonomy or home rule exists
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fact that the Legislature took pains to clarify under what
circumstances a fiscal administrator will be appointed.181 The court
must determine that the municipality is either reasonably certain to
fail to pay its debts or does not have sufficient funds to pay for its
current expenditures.182 Once appointed, the fiscal administrator is
not an unimpeachable figure. Both the State and the municipality
can request the court to terminate his appointment.183 Furthermore,
any showing of fraud, negligence, or misconduct is grounds for
termination.184 Thus, the fiscal administrator is accountable to the
State, the municipality, and the court for his actions, ensuring that
he operates within the bounds of his legislative authority.
B. Statutory Guidance
1. Who Should the Fiscal Administrator Be?
With the proposed amendment, the fiscal administrator’s
appointment becomes more significant and should therefore be
reconsidered. The State should choose the most qualified
individual to ensure that he is capable of handling the monumental
task of analyzing a municipality’s budget and identifying and
fixing its financial problems. Currently the law simply states that
the court must determine that the individual has the requisite
“education, experience and qualifications to enable him to perform
the duties of fiscal administrator.”185 The Legislature should
establish additional guidelines for the selection of the fiscal
administrator. First, the fiscal administrator should not be an
elected official to ensure that he is free from political bias. Second,
he should be an expert in government finances. Therefore the
Legislature should provide an illustrative list of qualified
individuals, including certified public accountants with experience
in government finances and former bankruptcy judges.186 These

only to the extent that the state constitution endows a local governmental entity
with two interactive powers: the power to initiate local legislation and the power
of immunity from control by the state legislature.” New Orleans Campaign for a
Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 So. 2d 1098, 1103 (La. 2002).
181. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1351(A)(2) (Supp. 2011).
182. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1351(B) (Supp. 2011).
183. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1354 (2007).
184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1351(C) (Supp. 2011).
185. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1351(B) (Supp. 2011).
186. The fiscal administrators appointed to St. Landry Parish and the Town of
Glenmora were accountants. Parish to Have Money Manager, TIMES-PICAYUNE
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additional qualifications provide more substantive guidance and
help ensure that the State appoints the most qualified person.
The State should also consider the proposed fiscal
administrator’s residence in relation to the municipality. Because
the local government is responsible for paying the fiscal
administrator, the Legislature should ensure that its financial
burden is as small as possible.187 The fiscal administrator’s travel
expenses will be borne by the municipality, so his residence should
be no more than 50 miles away.188 If it is impossible to find a
qualified person within this distance, the court may authorize a
reasonable extension of this radius.
2. Guidelines to Assist the Fiscal Administrator
The Legislature should establish guidelines to assist the fiscal
administrator in his decision-making process to ensure that he
authorizes a filing in accordance with the State’s interests. The
fiscal administrator must adhere to these guidelines and provide
written justification for filing along with his approval. The court
will review the fiscal administrator’s reasoning to ensure that he
has approved the filing in accordance with the legislative guidance.
First, a Chapter 9 filing should be authorized only under certain
circumstances. How the municipality arrived at its current financial
crisis should be a determining factor. A critical distinction should
be made between voluntary and involuntary debt.189 A
municipality that voluntarily takes on debt and then fails to repay
its creditors through its own misfeasance should rarely be
permitted to take advantage of Chapter 9. Voluntary debt thus
weighs heavily against a municipal bankruptcy filing. However, in
most cases, the fiscal administrator will correct such budget
mismanagement through adoption of his budgetary amendments.190

(New Orleans, La.), Jan. 1, 1992, at B5; Billy Gunn, State Controlling Glenmora’s
Finances, ALEXANDRIA DAILY TOWN TALK, Aug. 12, 2006, at 5A.
187. The fiscal administrator appointed to St. Landry Parish commuted from
Alexandria to manage the Parish’s finances. The Parish police jury commented
that it would have preferred someone closer because the fiscal administrator’s
mileage costs would be added to his hourly wages. Parish to Have Money
Manager, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 1, 1992, at B5.
188. This distance is based on the fact that there is a major city within 50
miles of most Louisiana cities. Northern Louisiana would present the most
problems because the cities are more dispersed in this region. The court would
have to use its discretion in granting an extension of the 50 mile radius.
189. See discussion supra Part II.C.
190. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1352 (Supp. 2011).
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Therefore, financial crises caused by voluntary debt mismanagement
will usually not require the fiscal administrator to even consider
bankruptcy as a solution.
Debt that is incurred involuntarily, such as by natural disaster,
a large monetary court judgment, or criminal malfeasance in
office, justifies the municipality getting favorable treatment over
its creditors.191 Because the municipality incurred the debt through
no fault of its own, the fiscal administrator may consider
bankruptcy under the following three circumstances. First, if the
fiscal crisis is caused by a natural disaster and neither the federal
nor state government provides sufficient assistance to cover the
municipality’s debt, the filing may be authorized.192 Second, if
there is a significant judgment assessed against the municipality,
the fiscal administrator may authorize a filing if (1) the appeals
process has been exhausted, and (2) the local government
attempted to negotiate a settlement in good faith.193 Finally, if the
municipality’s financial problems are attributed to criminal actions
of a local government official, the fiscal administrator may permit
a Chapter 9 filing.194 There may be other circumstances under
which a municipality experiences a financial crisis due to
involuntary debt. The fiscal administrator may authorize a filing in
such a case, but must provide written reasons for his decision.
In addition to meeting one of these threshold requirements, the
fiscal administrator must also determine that bankruptcy is the only
remaining viable option for the municipality. The State is
191. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:134 (Supp. 2011).
192. For example, after Hurricane Katrina left New Orleans underwater and
in financial shambles, had the federal government not stepped in to provide
extended emergency funding, the City may have faced bankruptcy. Before the
funding was extended in 2006, the Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana
argued that Chapter 9 might be a solution to the problem that was not going to
go away otherwise. BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & THE PUB. AFFAIRS
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., supra note 40, at 3.
193. Exorbitant judgments against a municipality can have devastating
effects—they unexpectedly wipe out any surplus, or worse, can be so large as to
equal or exceed the municipality’s entire budget for the year. In 2008, the
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office suffered such a judgment. The Office
was still paying off an exorbitant judgment from a few years before and had no
way to pay the new multimillion dollar judgment. See discussion supra Part
VI.C.1.
194. The criminal actions of one municipal official can have devastating
effects on the whole municipality. The Lower Cameron Parish Hospital Services
District amassed over $1 million in debt as a result of fraudulent actions on the
part of its chief executive officer. See supra note 6. The criminal action must
rise above the level of misfeasance of office. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:134
(Supp. 2011). The type of crime this Comment envisions involves deliberate
actions like the fraud committed in Lower Cameron Hospital Services District.
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obviously very concerned with keeping bankruptcy as a last resort
option.195 To meet the State’s intent, the fiscal administrator should
authorize the filing only if all other options have been exhausted or
no other reasonable course of action remains. Through his
examination of the municipality’s budget, the fiscal administrator
must make the following determinations. First, the fiscal
administrator must certify that taxes have been raised to the highest
level possible without creating an unreasonable burden on the
citizens, and that all revenue-producing assets are utilized to their
maximum capacity.196 In addition, the fiscal administrator must
justify any non-essential services that have not been cut from the
budget.197 Although it is unlikely, the fiscal administrator must
inquire into the possibility of borrowing more money. If the
municipality’s credit rating has not dropped so far as to prevent it
from obtaining additional loans, then it must pursue that option if
feasible and in its best interests. If all possible revenues have been
raised, all possible expenses have been cut, the municipality cannot
obtain additional loans, and there is still a deficit that will not be
extinguished within the following fiscal year, then the fiscal
administrator may authorize a Chapter 9 filing.
C. Benefits of the Proposed Legislation
Empowering the fiscal administrator to authorize a Chapter 9
bankruptcy filing streamlines the entire financial crisis procedure
and ensures that if the municipality opts for bankruptcy, it is truly a
well-thought-out decision. State involvement is now centralized in
one person—the person who is in the best position to make such a
decision. The process for handling municipal financial crises will
be more efficient because the fiscal administrator has the authority
to choose whatever course of action is in the best interest of the
municipality, including a Chapter 9 filing. The roadblock of
obtaining approval from the State Bond Commission is removed
from the chosen path to recovery. Once the fiscal administrator
determines that bankruptcy is the most prudent option, the
municipality may immediately take advantage of the benefits of
Chapter 9. In this collection-free sanctuary, the municipality can
more effectively negotiate with its creditors to develop the most
195. See discussion supra Part IV.
196. This requirement is an extension of the federal rule requiring a
municipality to be insolvent, which further ensures that a municipality has
exhausted its resources. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2006).
197. This requirement ensures that the municipality has made all practical
budget cuts before seeking bankruptcy.
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reasonable and advantageous debt readjustment plan possible.
Most situations will not result in bankruptcy, but in the rare
instance where the fiscal administrator decides that bankruptcy is
the best option, allowing him to authorize the filing will provide
more timely relief to the municipality drowning in debt.
1. A Reduction in Municipal Bankruptcies
One might assume that shifting the filing decision to the fiscal
administrator will result in more bankruptcies. This conclusion
overlooks the fact that in every instance where a Louisiana fiscal
administrator took control of a municipality’s finances, the local
government recovered from its fiscal crisis.198 For example, in
2006, the State appointed a fiscal administrator to the small town
of Glenmora in Rapides Parish after it had defaulted on a $204,990
federal government loan.199 The fiscal administrator discovered the
causes of the town’s anemic revenue, which included faulty utility
billing, corruption, and traffic ticket fixing.200 After a year under
the auspices of the fiscal administrator, the town was able to avoid
bankruptcy after selling its hospital and a nursing home.201
In 1992, a similar situation occurred when St. Landry Parish
defaulted on its general obligation bonds amounting to $1.2
million.202 As a result of a depressed oil and gas market, several
municipalities in the area had also faced financial crunches yet
managed to stay solvent by making difficult budget cuts.203 The
Parish’s officials were unwilling to make similar cuts, leading the
fiscal administrator to conclude that the local officials’ “lack of
budget discipline” was the main cause of the fiscal crisis.204 After
implementing the fiscal administrator’s recommended budget
amendments, the Parish was able to avoid bankruptcy.205 History
198. The lack of Louisiana Chapter 9 bankruptcy cases indicates that the
fiscal administrator was effective in all cases. To date there have been less than
ten fiscal administrators appointed. Editorial, Taking Control, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans, La.), Apr. 5, 2003, at 6.
199. See Michelle Millhollon, State Studies How to End Towns’ Financial
Woes, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Aug. 21, 2009, at B10.
200. Gunn, supra note 186. Traffic ticket fixing involves the illegal dismissal
of traffic tickets. Small municipalities often rely on traffic ticket payments to
supplement their budget. If enough tickets are “fixed,” the municipality will lose
revenue.
201. Auditor: Cotton Valley Must Cut $25K, THE TIMES (Shreveport, La.),
Sept. 23, 2009, at 1; Millhollon, supra note 199, at B10.
202. Yacoe, supra note 40, at 2.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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suggests that the appointment of a fiscal administrator leads to
fiscal recovery, not insolvency. This should reduce fears that the
broadening of the fiscal administrator’s authority will lead to
additional bankruptcy filings.
2. Prevention of Repeat Bankruptcies
There have been at least two municipalities nationwide that
have emerged from bankruptcy only to find themselves back in
Chapter 9 proceedings a few years later.206 Although recurring
bankruptcies are certainly not the norm, they raise the question of
whether Chapter 9 is effective as a long-term solution. The
municipalities’ problem was that they emerged from Chapter 9
without having addressed the causes of their fiscal crisis.207
Chapter 9 does not solve underlying issues with a municipality’s
financial management—that is something that the municipality
will have to address on its own. In Louisiana, state intervention via
the fiscal administrator prior to a bankruptcy filing helps prevent
recurring financial crises. The fiscal administrator is solving not
only the current financial emergency but also the core problems of
the municipality’s financial management.208 Even if the
municipality opts for Chapter 9, it is unlikely to experience
financial crisis again because it has new budgetary procedures in
place.
3. Prevention of Hasty Filings
The proposed amendment will also prevent municipalities from
requesting permission to file for Chapter 9 as a knee-jerk reaction
to financial crises. When a fiscal emergency arises suddenly, as a
result of a natural disaster or large monetary judgment against the
municipality, the officials’ instinct may be to seek bankruptcy
before fully exploring their options. For example, when the Fifth
Circuit awarded a $15 million judgment to a wrongly convicted
death row inmate, the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office
sought permission to file for bankruptcy within weeks of the
verdict.209 The judgment equaled the Office’s total annual budget,
206. The city of Macks Creek, Missouri filed for Chapter 9 in 1998 and again
in 2000. A Texas city, Westminster, filed for Chapter 9 in 2000 and later in
2004. Kimhi, supra note 1, at 381.
207. Id.
208. By amending the municipality’s budget, the fiscal administrator helps to
avoid future financial problems due to budget mismanagement.
209. Thompson v. Connick, 553 F. 3d 836, 842–43 (5th Cir. 2008), rev’d,
131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011); see also Johnson, supra note 40, at B2.
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which understandably sent the district attorney into a panic.210 But
following meetings with the state treasurer and attorney general,
the district attorney withdrew his request three days later, most
likely due to the state officials’ advice that his request would be
rejected because the appeals process had not been exhausted.211 In
times of fiscal crises like this one, a disinterested party, like a fiscal
administrator, is better able to analyze the situation and make a
decision based on reason rather than emotion. If a bankruptcy
filing is ultimately authorized, it will be a result of careful thought
and consideration.
4. Prevention of Long Term Contagion Effects
A final question remains about the justification of a Chapter 9
filing. Because a bankruptcy may adversely affect neighboring
municipalities as well as the State, how can the benefit to one
municipality outweigh the detriment to others? The answer comes
down to a balancing of near- and long-term state interests.
Although a municipal bankruptcy may have a contagion effect
on its neighbors and the State by temporarily downgrading their
bond credit ratings, there may be long-term contagion effects that
result from not allowing the municipality to pursue Chapter 9. For
example, if a municipality is denied a Chapter 9 option, it has no
choice but to increase taxes to unreasonable levels and cut services
to try to repay its creditors.212 When police, prison and public
hospital funds are cut to barebones levels, these service providers
cannot properly function. Crime will rise, prisons will become
overcrowded and dangerous, and the quality of hospital care will
diminish. These problems will not be contained within the
municipal boundaries. Neighboring towns will feel the
consequences: crime levels may increase, prisoners from
overcrowded prisons may be transferred to other parishes, and
patients may be forced to find care at other hospitals. Furthermore,
these effects may be felt much longer than the temporary decrease
in the municipality’s credit rating. In the long run, it will benefit
the State and its political subdivisions to afford a financially
distressed municipality access to Chapter 9. Municipal bankruptcy
210. Watts, supra note 41.
211. The district attorney “withdrew his request of the State Bond
Commission while his office pursue[d] and exhaust[ed] the standard appeals
process of the Thompson judgment through the federal courts.” Allen M.
Johnson, Jr., Orleans DA Drops Request for Bankruptcy, ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge, La.) Jan. 9, 2009, at A10.
212. See supra note 3.
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should not be embraced as a panacea, but it should remain
available as an option of last resort.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no question that Louisiana’s current municipal
bankruptcy laws will deter municipalities from considering
bankruptcy as an option. However, the law should not be aimed at
preventing bankruptcy; rather it should seek to ensure that
bankruptcy is chosen in only the direst of circumstances, when no
other option exists. Municipal bankruptcy is not a preferable
course of action. It can have severe consequences on both the
municipality itself and the State. But there are times when
bankruptcy is the best option for the local government and its
people. It is possible that municipal crises will occur more
frequently in the next decade. Louisiana may face times when
more municipalities require the assistance of a fiscal administrator.
Given such a possibility, it is wise to amend the legislation now so
the procedures are as comprehensive and sensible as possible. In
other words, it is better to fix the levee now before the next
hurricane hits.
Broadening the fiscal administrator’s authority to allow him to
authorize a municipality to file for bankruptcy will ensure
bankruptcy is chosen as a last resort. The shift in authority will
also streamline the process, and in the instance that Chapter 9 is
deemed necessary, it gives the municipality quicker access to the
benefits of Chapter 9, most notably the automatic stay. To assist
the fiscal administrator in his decision-making process, the
Legislature should also enact guidelines and a set of conditions to
be met before a bankruptcy petition can be filed. As a result of
these amendments, a local government will receive
comprehensive, impartial assistance from the fiscal administrator,
who will have the power to pursue all options in order to put the
municipality back into financial health.
Louisiana’s municipalities have managed to overcome various
financial crises without resorting to Chapter 9 bankruptcy.
However, it is prudent to examine the current legislation to ensure
that it properly meets the needs of Louisiana’s municipalities,
especially in uncertain economic times. In 1986, the mayor of
Tallulah “issued a proclamation asking God to help his financially
devastated city.”213 The State can help prevent such desperation in
213. The City’s prayers were answered when a fiscal administrator was
appointed to bring it back to fiscal health. A year later, the fiscal administrator
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the future by amending its laws to ensure that Chapter 9
bankruptcy is a viable option for municipalities that have no hope
of recovering on their own.
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